envy, equity-all of these represent legitimate but very different bases for generating "fair" or "just" outcomes. 4 Beyond this, people's perceptions of justice seem inevitably affected by self-interest, or an "egocentric bias. '5 Often unconsciously and quite naturally, people define fair outcomes in ways that favor themselves. 6 Given the difficulty-indeed, the apparent impossibility-of producing outcomes that everyone will immediately embrace as "just," the best that a society may be able to do is to focus upon who will be permitted to decree particular outcomes as just (with the enforcement power of the state to back such decrees) and how these persons will reach their decisions. 7 Different nations have established strikingly different justice systems, 8 all nonetheless aimed at the production of outcomes that are likely to be trusted by citizens as sufficiently just. 9 Inevitably, a society's values regarding the relationship between citizens and governmental authority influence the shape of its justice system, particularly the criteria for selecting decisionmakers whose decisions will be enforced by the state and the procedures that those decision-makers will use. Democratic systems of governance are characterized by procedures and structures designed to hold "rulers ... accountable for their actions in a public realm by citizens, acting independently or through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives." 10 In a democracy such as the United States, the rulers-including the decisionmakers-must submit to mechanisms that make them accountable to "the people," and they draw legitimacy from such accountability. 1 The transparency of this accountability affects democratic citizens' ability to trust that their decision-makers will deliver fair outcomes. It should not be surprising, therefore, that even though American courts are often described as the least democratic branch of government, their fundamental democratic pedigree is revealed in the mechanisms established for the appointment of judges and juries, the public nature of trials, the requirement of written opinions and the availability of appeal.
The most transparent example of structuring American courts to maximize accountability to "the people" involves the peculiarly American institution of the civil jury. Historically, the colonists viewed juries as the "guardians of local community values against outsider judges appointed by the royal governor" and "as bulwarks of integrity against corrupt public officials. '' 2 Leaders of the movement for American independence complained mightily about British attempts to reduce colonists' access to decision-making by juries. 13 Indeed, the importance of the right to civil jury trial emerged in state legislatures' debates regarding ratification of the Constitution. The Seventh Amendment ultimately provided that " [I] n suits at common law, where the amount in controversy exceeds twenty dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved. . ." By 1835, Alexis de Toqueville proclaimed the American jury as:
one form of the sovereignty of the people... The jury, and more especially the civil jury, serves to communicate the spirit of the judges to the minds of all the citizens; and this spirit, with the habits which attend it, is the soundest preparation for free institutions... It invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes them all feel the duties which they are bound to discharge towards society and the part which they take in its government. 1 4 A more contemporary commentator has observed: "More than when they vote, or pay taxes, or attend a parade, they [jurors] are realizing the democratic vision that still sustains our nation: They are governing themselves."' 5 The selection of federal and state judges is also grounded in the democratic presumption of accountability to "the people."' 6 Federal judges are nominated by an elected President and installed only after elected U.S. Senators have approved them.' 7 State judges, similarly, are selected by elected representatives "of the people"-or must face direct election and re-election by citizens. 18 Though both appointment and election have potential disadvantages, 19 such approaches to selection at least acknowledge citizens' appropriate role in selecting the decision-makers whose rulings will be enforced by the state. This form of selection also assures some level of accountability by judges to the citizens. Indeed, perhaps because many states' judges must return regularly to the citizens for re-election, these courts are more likely than federal courts to include citizen representatives in their planning processes and to focus on the need to provide "user-oriented" access. 20 Traditionally, then, when we have described the American justice system, we have drawn a clear relationship between democratic governance and the identification of the decision-makers whose determinations of elusive "justice" will be enforced as pronouncements of the state. This picture assumes the appropriateness of accountability to "the people." The traditional picture, however, no longer sufficiently represents the reality of the U.S. justice system. It may even misrepresent the bulk of that system and its level of accountability to a democratic citizenry.
II. DRIFTING FROM DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AS

THE SAFEGUARD OF "JUSTICE"
For the past several decades, nearly every democratic institution has come under increasingly injurious attack as inefficient, unable to fulfill its mission, and often inept. 2 1 The public justice system has been no exception. 2 Judges, meanwhile, have expressed very serious "postmodern" angst about their role. 28 Recently, one Pennsylvania trial court judge wrote: "[H]aving watched the process as a judge for nearly 20 years, it seems to me that the legal system can produce stability, predictability, recompense, retribution and perhaps many other things. What we cannot produce is true justice. ' 2 9 Professor Judith Resnik has written extensively about the federal courts' evolving composition and self-understanding, concluding that, "the federal judiciary has adopted an anti-adjudication and pro-settlement agenda," which includes a diminution in the role of traditional judges and the embrace of a variety of "new" quasi-judges or judi- Counselors and Peacemakers, 26 PA. LAW. 36, 37 (2004) . See also Resnik, supra note 20, at 926 (describing a trial judge who "equated going to trial with failure" and the frequency of the phrase "a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial" in judicial opinions) (emphasis added). cial adjuncts. 3° In the process, the "markers of difference [between traditional judges and other fact-finders] have diminished, while enthusiasm for delegation has grown. ' "31 This evolution may, as Professor Resnik suggests, represent the judicial system's inventive (or desperate) response to the nation's growing demand for adjudicative services accompanied by politicians' refusal to allocate the funds needed for a significantly expanded judiciary. 3 2 The judicial system's evolution may even be anticipated by organizational theories that predict that overwhelmed organizations will react by "increasing the numbers and kinds of providers, delegating duties, routinizing processes, and reconfiguring the work." ' 33 Indeed, social psychological theories may have predicted the judicial system's recent tendency to mirror the growth and bureaucratization of the other two branches of government and to spawn more tiers of hierarchy. 3 4 Despite the explanations, however:
in reinventing the role of the judge, [the federal judiciary] has also succeeded in undermining its singular claim to constitutional protection... Judges have, through their practices and doctrine, not only made plain the many facets of the role of judge, (judge as settler, judge as negotiator, judge as manager, judge as dealmaker) but also have so deconstructed judging that it is at risk of being undermined as a politically or legally viable concept. See, e.g., n. 235 and accompanying text. 35 Resnik also notes that:
[a] different kind of concern emerges about the deconstructive role of federal judges if one is intent on federal judicial supremacy but worried about how to maintain it. By encouraging a host of ADR providers, judges (who used to have a monopoly on the provision of judicial services) have helped to launch their competitors and now may have to jockey for what they deem to be the "good cases." Resnik, supra note 20. at 1003 n. 316.
The courts' expressions of self-doubt, though they evidence a somewhat attractive humility, also hint at a worrisome insecurity about publicly-elected and publicly-appointed judges' unique ability to declare justice in a democratic nation. 36 Furthermore, the courts' lack of self-esteem (some might even say self-loathing) has paved the way for other, less introspective and less accountable players to assume the role of decision-makers. 37
A. Delegation and Deference to Adjudication
by Administrative Agencies
Employees of administrative agencies today provide the first tier of adjudication for many, many disputes involving American citizens and their government. American courts' reliance upon and deference to the jurisdiction and decisions of this "hidden judiciary represents this Article's first example of disengaging the real judicial system of the United States from meaningful democratic accountability.
In 1934, proponents of the New Deal justified administrative agencies' assumption of adjudicative powers by pointing out the inadequacies of the courts: "the condition of our court dockets, the congestion of court calendars, the interminable delays and innumerable reverses on technical judicial grounds, '39 and a conservative judiciary's hostility to needed governmental reforms. 4°3
6 See Resnik, note 20, at 926. "Since the country's founding, the federal courts have been identified as an important participant in national governance." Id.
37 This Article will not criticize the rise of court adjuncts whose role is explicitly defined as assisting, rather than replacing, judges. The United States has a long history of such judicial assistants (e.g., original magistrate judges, special masters, United States commissioners 42 the Supreme Court proclaimed a flexible balancing test to determine the constitutionality of administrative adjudication of claims that normally would have been heard and decided in the courts. 43 The majority observed admiringly that the administrative procedure at issue in the case represented an "'inexpensive and expeditious' alternative to existing fora available to aggrieved customers, namely, the courts and arbitration [;] ' '44 "an agency's expertise is superior to that of a court ' 45 when dealing with legislation that the agency is responsible for enforcing; 46 and the courts should avoid "unduly constrict [ing] Congress' ability to take needed and innovative action... ,47 Not surprisingly, the majority found that the balancing test favored agency adjudication. 48 The Court 'cannot permanently be used as a conservative veto power,' Jackson proclaimed. Government by litigation was inefficient causing delay and uncertainty. Jackson opined that the judges' 'almost oriental devotion to precedent' obviated their 'need to reason' and restricted the actions not only of the legislative and the executive branches, but of the courts themselves. The United States' 'complicated governmental system,' steeped in federalism, required compromise and understanding from all sides in order to solve 'basic problems arising out of the depression and out of troubled industrial relations.' but 'the Courts have lately been closing the ways to political compromise.' The Assistant Attorney General concluded by declaring that Roosevelt sought 'in his policy and in his Court proposal to open the highway to economic and social peace' and by warning that 'the closed road' may mean a rough detour. J. 527, 590-91 (1997) .
41 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982) . "In sum, our Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle-that the 'judicial Power of the United States' must be reposed in an independent Judiciary. It commands that the independence of the Judiciary must be jealously guarded, and it provides clear institutional protections for that independence." Id.
42 478 U.S. 833 (1986). An obviously upset dissenting Justice Brennan expressed tremendous frustration with the majority's "abdication to claims of legislative convenience." 4 9 Joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan highlighted the importance of protecting accountability in a democratic system of governance:
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by men who had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked... With all the obvious flaws of delay [and] untidiness... we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.°J ustice Brennan further observed, "Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government... "51
Partly as a result of courts' doctrinal and philosophical choices like the one demonstrated in Commodity Futures, which seem to "make an ever-larger path for Congress to create [non-traditional] judgeships[,] ' ' 52 federal and state agencies today represent a vast and parallel "set of courts, with a specialized focus frequently involving claims against the government." 53 There are many more non-elected, non-legislatively-appointed judges located within federal agencies than there are traditional federal judges. In 2000, for example, there were about 829 Article III judges (i.e., 650 federal district court judges, 170 judges serving on federal courts of appeal, and 9 Supreme Court justices). 54 Meanwhile, federal agencies housed more than 1,400 semi-independent administrative law judges along with nearly 3,000 agency employees given titles, such as "hearing officers," "presiding officers," or "hearing examiners," responsible for "fulfilling judge-like roles but doing so outside the confines" 5 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act (the "APA"). The number of cases handled by agency adjudicators dramatically exceeds those filed in courts. In the late 1990's, for example, the Social Security Administration handled more than 500,000 cases per year, while there were about 260,000 civil filings in the federal courts.
6
Many have raised concerns regarding the relationship between administrative adjudicators and the agencies that select them, employ them and then turn to them for decisions in disputed cases.
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To reduce agencies' ability to influence individual Administrative Law Judges ("ALJs"), the APA provides certain salary and employment protections; 5 8 ALJs also may be disqualified on the basis of personal bias. 5 9 But most ALJs remain embedded within agencies, and structural bias is rarely viewed as a sufficient basis for disqualification or vacatur of an ALJ's decision. 6° The concerns are even stronger for the hearing officers, presiding officers and hearing examiners described supra. They do not come within the protections of the APA, often are expected to serve multiple roles (e.g., regulator and hearing examiner), and are given none of the markers of judicial prestige. These conditions suggest strongly that many administrative adjudicators will feel more accountable to the agencies and their current interpretations of their missions, than to "the people." Perhaps predictably, these largely-unprotected adju-55 Id. at 40 (observing that these adjudicators represent the "hidden judiciary" and that the number of hearing officers in different federal agencies varies dramatically, with one full-time judicial officer in the United State Post Office in 2001 and 1,100 located in the Social Security Administration); see also The justice provided by these non-democratically-selected judges is supposed to be safeguarded by citizens' right to seek appellate review before a traditional court. 62 The courts, however, exercise an extraordinarily light supervisory touch over their administrative delegates. First, the courts generally limit their review to the record as developed by administrative courts, and may even be satisfied with the findings of fact and reasoning contained in administrative judges' opinions. 63 Second, the courts grant great deference 64 to the decisions of agencies' judges, generally not overturning them unless they are proven to be "arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion, ' the rise of decision-making by those who have neither been elected nor appointed by elected officials (and who may be understood as only "quasi-independent" of home agencies) also should raise concerns regarding the dilution of our justice system's relationship to democratic governance as a safeguard of "justice." The commitment to justice as determined by representatives "of the people" is giving way to resolution by those who are more likely to accommodate the structure, norms and needs of one set of the players-the institutional, repeat players-involved in disputes.
B. The Embrace of and Deference to
Decision-Making by Arbitrators
More recently, the courts have embraced arbitrators as another set of decision makers to whom the courts may delegate adjudicative responsibilities. 6 7 Historically, merchants turned to arbitration for cost effective and efficient resolution that would be consistent with industry norms. 68 Over the years, however, courts have praised the process for its "simplicity, informality, and expedition '69 and expanded its permissible use to include the resolution of statutory claims and disputes involving employers and employees, consumer companies and individual consumers, securities dealers and individual investors, and franchisors and franchisees. Indeed, the Supreme Court has established a preference for arbitration, finding that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration...
[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." 7 0 Today, large numbers of dis- 162, 163 (2003) (noting that the "many different chapters to the story of arbitration" include "the theme of contract freedom that.., challenges the authority of the established social hierarchy in elaborating essential norms[,J" as well as the need for American society to "secure a measure of workable adjudicatory justice for its citizens" and respond to "the social thirst for fair and rational ordering"). REV. 819, 830, 860-65 (2003) (discerning a hint in recent decisions of the Supreme Court that it may be demonstrating less deference toward arbitration and the achievement of judicial efficiency after "a burst of judicial exuberance"). putes are resolved through arbitration. 71 In several recent decisions that have upheld mandatory arbitration clauses, a majority of the Supreme Court has once again displayed a rather remarkable lack of self-respect for the unique role of the courts, as democratic institutions, to declare justice. 72 In Mitsubishi, for example, the Court observed:
[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution. . . By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.
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In Gilmer, the Court brusquely rejected "generalized attacks on arbitration" as "far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statute favoring this method of resolving disputes. ' 72 See Reuben, supra note 70, at 860-65. Reuben also observes that when litigants expect access to a courtroom and instead, under the doctrine of separability, are "thrust into a forum in which standard contract defenses have no legal force[,J" and so litigants' trust in the courts and rule of law may suffer. Id. at 848. 75 Carbonneau, supra note, at 68 (emphasis added). Professor Carbonneau also argues:
The rise of arbitration demonstrates the inability of courts to remain functional when proceedings are dominated by adversarial legal representation and an unbending standard of due process... In different ways and to different degrees... arbitration and mediation cure the failings of the law and the judicial process. The growing success of these procedures argues persuasively for limiting the State's jurisdictional authority to matters of criminal liability and to the resolution of divisive political issues. . .Arbitration and mediation not only "deconstruct" the law, but they also provide for "reconstruction" by acting as substitute processes for dispute resolution. commentators have increasingly raised concerns regarding the structural bias arising out of arbitrators' and arbitral organizations' financial reliance upon these institutional, repeat users of arbitration services. 7 6 In California, such concerns have resulted in new, strict ethics standards requiring arbitrators to make individual disclosures regarding information that might indicate personal favoritism towards repeat players, as well as potential bias on the part of the provider organizations with which the arbitrators are associated. 7 7
The courts' standard of review to assure the justice provided by arbitrators' decisions, meanwhile, is even more limited than that available for reviewing the decisions of administrative judges. The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") permits courts to vacate arbitral awards only on the grounds of corruption or if the arbitrators have engaged in extraordinary adjudicatory unfairness or exceeded their powers. 78 Courts have also developed three common law grounds for vacatur-manifest disregard of the law, arbitrary or capricious or irrational, violation of public policy-but "[s]omewhat paradoxically, the elaboration of [these] additional grounds for review in the case law has not created a greater likelihood of vacatur. '' 79 For example, in order to demonstrate manifest disregard of the law, an arbitral award must display "more than an error or misunderstanding with respect to the law... The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator." 8 Further, in order to show "disregard," the party seeking vacatur must be able to show that "the arbitrator appreciate [d] reasons for their awards. 82 Once again, the courts' enthusiasm for delegating decision-making to other adjudicators has been accompanied by a level of supervision that "take[s] on an air of unreality."" As evidenced by repeat players' dominance in the selection of arbitrators and the near-meaninglessness of the judicial review of arbitral decisions, the courts seem to be giving no thought to the need to make adjuncts of the judicial system accountable in some way to the people of a democratic nation. 84 In their zeal to divert cases to arbitrators for decision-making, the courts are further distancing the judicial system from its democratic roots.
C. The Marginalization of the Jury in Civil Litigation
Meanwhile, of course, the peculiarly democratic institution of the civil jury has been steadily marginalized until it is now in a near-iconic state.
8 5 Historically, courts permitted cases to go to juries for fact-finding as long as the record contained evidence of "some non-frivolous dispute about the existence or interpretation 82 See ALLAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 745 (3rd ed. 2002) (noting that "the obvious less of innumerable commercial arbitration cases is that lack of a reasoned opinion will help to insulate an award from judicial scrutiny."). See also Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that because the award presented "only a cursory discussion of what the arbitrators considered to be the key points underlying the award[,]" the court concluded that "[i]t cannot be said that it clearly appears that the arbitrators identified applicable law and proceeded to reach a contrary position in spite of it."); Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino Inc., 129 N.J. 479 (N.J. 1992) (confirming arbitral award of $14 million accompanied by a one-sentence explanation, where a concurring justice observed, "for all we know, the arbitrators concluded that the sun rises in the west, the earth is flat, and damages have nothing to do with the intentions of the parties or the foreseeability of the consequences of a breach.").
83 Id. at 745. Courts have even found a way to strengthen the deference that should be shown to the awards of court-connected arbitrators in "non-binding" arbitration programs. Increasingly, parties who have participated in non-binding arbitration may be sanctioned if they request a trial de novo and fail to improve sufficiently upon the "advisory" arbitral award. These disincentives become more than a little worrisome when one factors in the reality that these arbitral proceedings are quick, and courts rarely try to match arbitrators' substantive expertise with cases.
84 See Reuben, supra note 70, at 121-22 (finding that there is little accountability in arbitration; also examining the extent to which arbitration is consistent with other democratic values such as participation, transparency, rationality, equality, due process, and personal autonomy and dignity 9 4 permitted a trial judge to grant summary judgment if, despite the existence of evidence to support the nonmovant's arguments regarding a genuine issue of material fact, the judge found the nonmovant's proposed inferences "implausible." 95 One commentator has argued that "the opinion in Matsushita appears to be crafted not by a judge searching for an issue of fact for trial, but by a panel of fact finders trying to determine a verdict." 96 In these opinions, the Supreme Court effectively reduced the courts' traditional reliance upon and deference to the common sense exercised by representatives "of the people" on civil juries.
Not surprisingly, a study recently conducted by Professor Marc Galanter reveals a marked decline in jury trials and an increase in disposition by summary judgment. While 5.5 % of all civil 97 Simultaneously, it appears that disposition by summary judgment has grown-from 3.7% in 1975 to 7.7% in 2000.98 Though summary judgment still involves decision-making by a judge-not a delegate or adjunct-the marginalization of the civil jury offers additional evidence of the courts' increasing disengagement of adjudication from democratic governance and accountability to common citizens.
D. Summary
A few observations are now in order. First, as the courts have approved the delegation of adjudication to administrative judges and arbitrators, they have permitted state-sanctioned decisionmaking to migrate from a public and impartial body to third parties often selected by one of the disputing parties-usually the institutional, repeat players with greater economic strength. 99 99 Recently, Cullen Murphy has used multiple examples of the "outsourcing" of traditionally governmental functions (e.g., school systems, security, military, mail service, airports, prisons, hospitals) to draw provocative parallels between the organization of societies in the Middle Ages and today. Murphy observes:
[T]he historian F. L. Ganshof discerned in feudal society "a dispersal of political authority amongst a hierarchy of persons who exercise in their own interest powers normally attributed to the State." In the West the path away from the Middle Ages was marked by the evolution of governments and nation-states with a sense of responsibility for the public interest rather than merely private interests. Power was no longer a form of property. Social services and protections became a consequence of citizenship, not a private deal between a lord and his vassals, or between a private entity and its clients... But at some point in the late twentieth century evolution's arrow began changing direction-toward the reprivatization of everything. the courts have come to rely on these adjuncts, they have facilitated a shift from decision-makers whose legitimacy rests in being representatives of a democratic people to those who are more likely to espouse the legal/technical norms preferred by the institutional parties. To a lesser, but nonetheless significant degree, the courts are affecting a similar shift as they abandon reliance on civil juries and instead dispose of cases based on sterile "paper trial[s] on the merits." 00 Ultimately, though perhaps unconsciously, the courts seem to be distancing state-sanctioned decision-making from the messiness of democracy and placing greater faith in the predictability and efficiency of decision-making by organizational technocrats.
III. THE CURRENT PLACE OF MEDIATION IN THE EVOLUTION
OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Within the last decade, another dispute resolution processmediation-has become the "darling" 1 0 1 of the courts. Court-connected mediation programs began to appear in the 1980's and, at this point, can be found in nearly all state and federal courts. Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil has urged that the process "democratized our institution [the courts] in potentially profound ways because mediation permitted, in fact actively encouraged, the parties to decide for themselves which values were most important to them, then to use ADR to pursue those values. ' 1 0 2 Has the rise of mediation "democratized" the courts, potentially reversing the trend described thus far in this Article? The answer to this question depends upon one's view of the implementation of court-connected mediation. As is so often the case, the devil is in the details.
There can be little doubt that the "contemporary mediation movement" 1 0 3 of the late 1970's and early 1980's was inspired by the principles of democracy. Mediation proponents emphasized the central role to be played by citizens in disputes. 0 4 Citizensnot judges or attorneys or other professionals-would communicate and negotiate directly with each other, identify the issues to be discussed, determine the substantive norms that were legitimate and relevant (including the pursuit of harmony and reconciliation if they wished),°5 create the options for settlement, and control the final decision regarding whether or not to settle and on what terms.
1 0 6 The mediator's role was to facilitate and to help these disputing parties find their own voices and solutions. Ultimately, mediation "seemed to embody both a faith in the dignity and autonomy of individual citizens and a skepticism regarding the legitimacy of government authorities and professionals.'
Certainly, there are ways in which court-connected mediation has stayed true to this democratic spirit. Consistent with the values of self-determination and accountability, there is no binding outcome in mediation unless the parties agree to it. Attorneys, who generally attend these mediation sessions, report that their understanding of their clients' goals and potential solutions are influenced by the clients' presence. 108 No doubt, some mediation sessions result in creative resolutions that reflect the particular needs, abilities, and preferences of parties. Court-connected mediation also offers citizens at least some degree of participation. At most mediation sessions, the parties attend and contribute to the discussion either directly or through their attorneys. The parties thus are not forced to rely blindly on their attorneys to conduct separate, bilateral settlement negotiations. 10 9 But substantial data also suggests that mediation is not infusing the courts with a new manifestation of democracy. Instead, as the courts have come to rely on mediators as the next set of judging 241, 309-13 (2002) (urging that court-connected mediation has resulted in "some convergence between the structure and actions of mediation and traditional litigation"). 109 Research suggests that because they can attend, and thus, can at least observe that their stories are being told and considered in an even-handed and dignified proceeding, parties are more likely to conclude that their mediation session was procedurally just. See Welsh, supra note 7, at 838-39. adjuncts, 1 10 the mediation process and the roles of both mediators and parties have changed. When parties failed to make significant voluntary use of mediation, courts made the process mandatory. 1 " Thus, citizens lost the ability to decide for themselves whether or not to try mediation. As attorneys have become more frequent participants in mediation sessions and have assumed responsibility for selecting mediators, the process has become less focused on empowering citizens and more focused on forcing these citizens to confront and become reconciled to the legal, bargaining and transactional norms of the courthouse.1 12 Attorneys select fellow attorneys as mediators and especially value those who possess substantive expertise and the ability to value cases and conduct "reality testing" with the parties. 13 Many of these mediators maximize their own influence by minimizing the time spent by the parties in joint session. These mediators quickly separate the parties and become their sole channel of communication and negotiation, shuttling back and forth with the information and descriptions of offers and counter-offers that will facilitate settlement. 114 Attorneys also now dominate the discussion and negotiation in mediation sessions. 1 15 Indeed, in many personal injury and medical malpractice cases, the defendants are not expected to attend mediation sessions,' 16 and in some courts, parties generally are discouraged from attending. 117 These changes in the implementation of mediation, though often understandable, generally have the effect of constricting, not celebrating, citizens' ability to engage in selfgovernance and demand accountability from the mediators, the mediation process and mediated outcomes." 8 In sum, court-con-114 See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 7, at 809-13 (describing the marginalization of joint session and rise of caucus in court-connected mediation); Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass supra note 107, at 669-71 (describing disputants' reactions to caucus which relate to perceptions of procedural justice); Ian Ayres & Barry J. Nalebuff, Common Knowledge as a Barrier to Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1631 REV. , 1633 REV. -34 (1997 (describing the strategic use of caucus to avoid the communication of higher-order information).
115 See, e.g., Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Attorneys' Negotiation Strategies in Mediation: Business as Usual, MEDIATION Q., Vol. 17, No. 4, 377, 383 (2000) . "[A]ttorneys rather than disputants are unquestionably the main negotiators in mediated settlement conferences." Id. See also Gordon, supra note 113, at 227 (reporting that in observed mediations, lawyers dominated negotiation, the minority of clients who did "play active roles" were "supporting rather than starring players," and that three-quarters of responding attorneys disagreed with the statement, "Litigants should be the most active participants in mediation, with attorneys standing by to offer legal advice."); Metzloff et al., supra note 113, L. REV. 71, 99 (1998) (reporting that the Civil Appeals Management Plan of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit "neither expects nor requires party participation, though mediators may invite the parties to attend the conference").
117 This is the case, for example, in the mediation program established by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. The order establishing the program provides that, "[aill mediation sessions must be attended by counsel for each party with authority to settle the matter, and, if required, such other person with actual authority to negotiate a settlement." While the order also provides that " [t] he mediation judge may at his or her discretion require the parties (or real parties in interest) to attend mediation," it has not been the practice of the mediation judge to require the clients to attend. It is usually the case that clients do not attend the mediation session. The clients that do arrive at the mediation session with their attorneys generally are not included in most of the negotiation that occurs in the session. Telephone Interview with John Gordon, Program Director, Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Mediation Program (Feb. 28, 2001) .
118 See Reuben, Dispute Resolution and Democracy, supra note 10 (suggesting several criteria-including autonomy, participation and accountability-that should be used to ex-nected mediation has evolved from a process that focused on enhancing individual citizens' voice, control and assurance of accountability into a mechanism that resolves cases by reconciling these citizens to the institutional reality (or at least mediators' and attorneys' perception of the reality) of the courts and litigation.' 1 9
In addition, and consistent with the courts' minimal oversight of administrative law judges and arbitrators, most courts do very little to assure the accountability of the mediation process, individual mediators, or mediated outcomes. 120 The mediators on many courts' rosters are private providers who are selected by attorneys and paid by the parties, not the courts. This structure permits court-connected mediation programs to operate quite self-sufficiently and, from the courts' perspective, quite cost-effectively. Indeed, in many states, mediation is now a business, with a small group of insurers as repeat players and a select group of mediators handling a large number of the cases. Though courts generally require mediation skills training in order to qualify for service on a roster of court-connected mediators, few courts have designated a staff member to monitor the mediators' performance, regularly observe mediation sessions, or gather and evaluate feedback from parties and attorneys. Unfortunately, some court-connected mediators have even welcomed the cessation of evaluation efforts amine the relationship between democracy and arbitration); Robert Ackerman, The Administrative Process as a Response to Tragedy: The September 11 Victim Compensation Fund (forthcoming, on file with author) (discussing accountability in the context of the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund).
119 See Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Justice, 69 JUDICATURE 257 (describing the evolution of judicial enthusiasm for settlement). As long ago as 1947, one judge observed:
Pre-trial seems to have developed a method of disposing of controversies, within the court, with the aid of lawyers, but without the delay. expense and technicality that have cursed the judicial process for years. It eliminates appeals. It commends itself to businessmen as a sensible and practicable procedure. It provides a method by which disputes can be disposed of in a way that leaves all parties satisfied instead of one or both disgruntled and with a grievance against courts and the law. It should increase the use of the courts. Id. at 259, quoting Harry D. Nims, Pretrial in the United States, 25 CAN. B. REv. 697. 717-18 (1947) . See also Resnik. supra note 20. at 933-49 (arguing that federal courts have embraced settlement as a result of changes in their dockets, promotion of settlement in judicial training, and the federal courts' increasing sense of themselves as a corporate, business-like body with its own institutional needs and agenda).
120 See Barbara McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, General Civil ADR in ADR HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES (forthcoming, on file with author) (describing the relationship between courts and court-connected mediators, including selection requirements, payment, quality assurance and discipline).
as a signal of the courts' confidence in them.' 2 ' As Magistrate Judge Brazil has observed, courts' financial constraints must be acknowledged as real and must be confronted "squarely.' 122 But, as Brazil has also warned, the temptation to "cut administrative corners and sometimes... take great risks with quality control... could jeopardize public confidence not only in ADR, but also in the courts themselves.' 2 3 Such public confidence and accountability are essential in a democracy.
Courts might also exercise quality control by carefully scrutinizing mediated settlement agreements, particularly when one of the parties objects to enforcement of the agreement or seeks to set it aside. Increasingly, courts are hearing these sorts of arguments, often accompanied by allegations that mediators engaged in coercive and/or biased behaviors. 124 Courts, however, are rarely sympathetic to these parties who seek to undo settlement agreements. Mediators' evaluative interventions, even when they are quite aggressive, are unlikely to qualify as "coercive enough" to merit returning cases to the courts' trial dockets. 125 Indeed, some courts seem to view unhappy parties' attempts to undo their mediated settlement agreements as nothing less than an affront to the judicial system itself. 26 Thus, courts' delegation of the settlement function to mediators is marred by the same coupling of deference and lack of real accountability that characterizes the courts' delegation of adjudicative functions to administrative and arbitral forums.
IV. RETURNING TO MEDIATION'S PROMISE AS A MEANS TO REINVIGORATE A DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE SYSTEM
In general, the courts' current zeal for delegation combined with the lack of meaningful accountability mechanisms threatens to undermine the courts' entitlement to respect as democratic institutions doing their best to deliver justice. about the consequences of a single-minded focus on the achievement of efficient resolution:
[Tlhose who would insist on using only efficiency criteria to assess the value of ADR programs jeopardize the courts' most precious and only necessary assets: public confidence in the integrity of the processes the courts sponsor and public faith in the motives that underlie the courts' actions. We must take great care not to make program design decisions that invite parties to infer that the courts care less about doing justice and offering valued service than about looking out for themselves as institutions (e.g., by reducing their workload, or off-loading kinds of cases that are especially taxing or emotionally difficult or that are deemed "unimportant.").
1 27
Thus far, this Article has examined the large-scale "program design decisions" that present a cumulative threat to the trust that a democratic people can and should place in those entrusted with delivering the justice that will be enforced by the state. The remainder of the Article will consider the program design decisions that can and should be made in order to reassure citizens that the courts and their adjuncts-at least mediators as settlement adjuncts-remain accountable to "the people" and thus can be trusted to deliver justice.
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The first program design choice actually involves ADR advocates more than it does courts. In the last couple of decades, mediators and mediation advocates have done their share of bashing the courts and the public justice system, as part of a strategy to justify replacing judges with someone or something else. But the common good of a democratic nation benefits from the existence of a sufficiently-supported and accountable public justice system. Mediation advocates need to help our courts overcome their current problems and regain an appropriate measure of self-respect for their unique role in enabling a democratic people to govern themselves. This means, of course, becoming advocates for sufficient funding for courts, the appointment of sufficient numbers of judges and the protection of judges' independence from inappropriate economic or political influence. ADR experts who have traveled to other countries to teach or consult regarding ADR have realized that healthy ADR programs require healthy judicial systems. 129 The same mutually symbiotic relationship should exist in the United States.
The second program design choice is likely to appear painful, but may be less so than it first seems. Courts should end their reliance on mandatory mediation.1 30 The courts are lending their legitimacy to mediation in requiring its use. The combination of mandatory programs and a lack of significant accountability measures, however, invite abuse and a potential deterioration of the courts' legitimacy. If mediation is truly a valuable process that responds to citizens' desires for an alternative means to resolve disputes, the process should be able to stand on its own, freely selected by parties as their disputes arise. At the very least, the courts' authority to mandate mediation should sunset within two to three years after a court-connected mediation program has been introduced. During this initial phase, attorneys will become educated about the process.
13 1 Research indicates that once attorneys use mediation, they become advocates for its future use. If attorneys have not become advocates, there is probably something wrong with the program, and it deserves to end.
Finally, and especially while the use of mediation is mandatory or strongly encouraged by judges, the courts should view mediators as their agents-and provide for meaningful oversight that assures just resolution.
1 32 Courts can accomplish such oversight by establishing expectations beyond settlement for their mediators. The procedural justice literature provides a rich set of measures of those behaviors that are likely to be perceived as just. 133 Courts also should assign staff to monitor mediators' performance through periodic observations, distribution and assessment of meaningful post-mediation surveys and interviewing of attorneys and parties. Disp. RESOL. 319 n. 104 (urging that the "absence of a legitimate and trusted legal system prevents full assimilation and acceptance of a supplementary set of institutions to offer different forms of conflict resolution" but noting that others argue otherwise).
130 See generally Hensler, supra note 104, at 165. 131 See Welsh, supra note 106, at 24. 132 The Code of Conduct for United States Judges, particularly Canon 3, should also be revised to make it clear that judges have an obligation to oversee those to whom they have delegated the settlement function. See Canon 3, "A Judge Should Perform the Duties of the Office impartially and Diligently," available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/chl. html#3 (last visited Apr. 4, 2004) .
133 See Welsh, supra note 7, at 817-26.
Such monitoring exists in good court-connected programs. It should be common in all programs.
134
Though procedural justice often results in perceptions of substantive justice, courts also need to do more to ensure that mediated outcomes are fair according to some principled set of norms. One alternative is to require courts to review and approve mediated settlement agreements. Obviously, this option presents difficulties for an already-overloaded system and is likely to result in replication of the deferential standards of review that afflict other contexts. Alternatively, courts could provide a short cooling-off period for mediated settlement agreements, during which the parties themselves could evaluate the fairness of the outcome-using whatever norms they deem legitimate-and choose to accept or rescind their agreements without penalty. Such cooling-off periods are relatively common in divorce and child custody mediation and are relatively straightforward mechanisms to ensure that parties perceive their agreements as sufficiently just. From the courts' perspective, the adoption of cooling-off periods for mediated agreements would signal mediators' ultimate accountability to the citizens involved in this court-connected process. A cooling-off period would reward productive mediator behaviors that build parties' commitment to and investment in their agreements and create a negative consequence for those mediators who employ aggressive tactics that endanger courts' legitimacy as the domain in which citizens will experience justice. 1 3 5
CONCLUSION
The judicial system of the United States seems to be changing, and mediation is playing one small part in that change. Yet, change should be tempered by context, and even as the judicial system changes, it should reflect the values of our democracy. Our courts draw their legitimacy from their accountability to, and the responding support of, a democratic people. Within the context of democracy, judicial adjuncts exercising public functions must also be held 135 See Welsh, supra note 106, at 91-92.
accountable for the justice of their decision-making procedures and outcomes. Perhaps mediation, which has so far played a relatively small role in the judicial system's larger evolution, can play a much more significant part in helping the courts reconcile the need for delegation (or more pejoratively, "outsourcing") and accountability. Mediation may then become an important complement that helps the courts play their appropriate role in the lives of the citizens in a democratic nation.
